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This paper proposes and studies a theory of adaptive consumption behavior under income uncertainty
and liquidity constraints. We assume that consumption is governed by a linear function of wealth,
whose coefficients are revised each period by a procedure, which, although sophisticated, places few
informational or computational demands on the consumer. We show that under a variety of settings,
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The standard theory of lifetime utility maximization under uncertainty and liquidity constraints
places enormous informational and computational demands on the consumer. Carroll (2001), a
leading researcher in the area, presents this theory and argues that “when there is uncertainty
about the future level of labor income, it appears to be impossible under plausible assumptions
about the utility function to derive an explicit solution for consumption as a direct (analytical)
function of the model’s parameters”. Similarly, Allen and Carroll (2001) admit that “ﬁnding
the exact nonlinear consumption policy rule (as economists have done) is an extraordinarily
diﬃcult mathematical problem”. This problem raises two closely related questions. First, are
there simpler rules that have low welfare costs? And, second, can consumers learn the optimal
rule or a simple low-cost rule? The ﬁrst question has been studied with positive results for
certain models (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1985a,b; Allen and Carroll, 2001; Cochrane, 1989). On
the other hand, the second question has only been addressed, as far as we know, by Lettau and
Uhlig (1999) and Allen and Carroll (2001), but with negative results.
In this paper, we propose an alternative adaptive theory of consumption behavior, which,
in the spirit of Simon (1990), Arthur (1994) and Clark (1997), places limited demands on
the consumer. We show that consumers who use this adaptive mechanism are able to learn
a rule with a low welfare cost after a few periods. In particular, we show that constant-
relative-risk-aversion consumers who follow a linear consumption rule in wealth and use our
proposed algorithm, which adaptively adjusts the parameters of their rule, lose less than 0.5%
of the equivalent consumption of the fully rational consumption rule within 500 periods with a
probability higher than 0.9. Furthermore, we show that under social learning, the time required
to attain a loss of 0.5% falls to less than 100 periods for some parametrizations. Additionally,
the mean and median welfare losses, under both individual and social learning, fall to around
1% in less than 25 periods.1
1In an independent paper, Evans and McGough (2009) also address the question of adaptive approximation
to optimal intertemporal choice. They present a procedure for updating expectations that is asymptotically fully
optimal in a linear-quadratic environment, given that the decision maker knows enough about her environment
to specify the correct functional form of her policy function. By contrast, we have found an adaptive procedure
for updating the parameters of the policy function that works “reasonably well” even outside a linear-quadratic
2The main problem with adaptive intertemporal choice is that there is no obvious simple
criterion by which to measure the success of a rule one is trying out. Clearly, one has to look
beyond the immediate utility ﬂow it is generating, because the rule also has the potential of
generating consumption in the future. But how does one evaluate that future potential in the
same terms as the current utility ﬂow, without undertaking computations that are as elaborate
as those involved in solving the dynamic programming problem directly?
In both Lettau and Uhlig (1999) and Allen and Carroll (2001) the criterion of success
is an estimate, based on past performance, of the discounted inﬁnite sum of utilities. Lettau
and Uhlig use a variant of Holland’s (1992) classiﬁer system, in which they call the measure
of a rule’s success its “strength”. In each period after a rule has been used, its strength is
adjusted partially towards the sum of the immediate utility attained under the rule last period
plus the discounted strength of the rule that has succeeded it. They show however that the
classiﬁer system does a poor job of approximating optimal consumption behavior, even when
the optimal consumption rule is available to the consumer. Their result follows from the fact
that the system exhibits “state bias”; that is, it favors rules that apply in good states. Allen
and Carroll, on the other hand, assume that the consumer is able to perform what amounts to a
Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate each rule. They show that this procedure, instead of being
quick and simple, actually needs 4 million periods in order to determine the optimal rule in their
parameterization.2 Accordingly, they argue that the procedure “is not an adequate description
of the process by which consumers learn about consumer behavior” (Allen and Carroll, 2001,
p.268).
Our approach follows Allen and Carroll in restricting consumers to rules that are linear in
current wealth (for their parameterization they show that the optimal linear rule is almost as
good as the optimal unrestricted rule). But instead of responding to a measure of cumulative
discounted utility, we assume that the consumer adjusts her rule gradually in response to
environment when the decision-maker does not know the correct functional form. (¨ Ozak’s (2009) analytical
results show that our procedure will almost never be asymptotically fully optimal.)
2Allen and Carroll use a 5% threshold in order to assume the optimal rule has been found successfully. Under
this assumption they require 1 million periods in order to get a success rate of 0.75 and of 4 million to get at
least a success rate of 0.85.
3the diﬀerence between the immediate marginal utility implied by the rule and the discounted
marginal utility of next period’s consumption. In eﬀect our criterion of success is the ex post
Euler equation error, and our algorithm operates like a stochastic approximation (see Robbins
and Monro (1951), Ljung (1977) or Kushner and Yin (2003)) for solving the consumer’s Euler
equation.3
Although our approach presumes an awareness of sophisticated notions of Euler equations
and numerical methods, nevertheless the informational and computational requirements of our
algorithm are very low. Moreover, these requirements are independent of the size of the set
of rules or states, which make it a good candidate for an adaptive procedure under bounded
rationality for the problem at hand. In contrast, both requirements are increasing in the number
of rules and states for Lettau and Uhlig and for Allen and Carroll. The reason for this diﬀerence
is that in our algorithm, each period a consumer needs to revise the two parameters deﬁning
her linear rule, based only on its performance last period, whereas in the other papers, the
consumer must to keep track of the past performance of a large number of rules under all
states.
In our simulations, the algorithm converges with very high probability (at least 0.80, see
table 4) in less than 500 periods for a set of parameters, which includes the same parameter-
ization that took 4 million periods under the Carroll-Allen procedure. Although this is a big
improvement vis-` a-vis previous work, 500 periods is a long time for agents to learn. For exam-
ple, Brown, Chua, and Camerer (2009) who study saving decisions in an experimental setting,
ﬁnd that their experimental subjects require around 120 periods to learn to behave optimally,
with the average subject attaining around 80% of the optimal around that period. But in a
world of boundedly rational consumers, clearly what matters to them in economic terms is not
how long it takes to converge to a high degree of mathematical precision, but how long it takes
before the welfare loss is small, say two or three percent. In those terms, even after 50 periods
our mechanism imposes a small welfare cost on almost all consumers compared to the fully
3The idea that the opportunity cost of current spending could be learned adaptively through experience
rather than calculated ex ante was suggested by Leijonhufvud (1993) in the context of Marshallian demand
theory.
4optimal nonlinear consumption function (see ﬁgures 12-21).
Even 50 years might seem too long for the procedure to be a reasonable description of
opportunistic behavior on the part of the representative consumer. But in our view we should
think of the representative consumer in statistical terms - as the mean or median consumer. This
view accords with a long tradition in economics dating back at least to Marshall (1890, III,3.5),
according to which economists cannot hope to account for the behavior of each individual
with his or her idiosyncrasies, just the average behavior of large groups of individuals. In this
respect it appears that our procedure approximates the optimal consumption behavior of a
representative agent very well indeed; as we shall see in more detail below (tables 7-12), the
mean or median welfare loss under our algorithm in most parameterizations is less than 2%
after less than 10 periods.
In addition to our baseline simulations, we generalize our mechanism in order to study
the eﬀects of social learning, relaxation of credit constraints and changes to the agent’s income
process. Our brief analysis of social learning suggests that when imitation is allowed for, the
time required for losses to be less than 0.5% with probability 0.9 falls to around 100 periods,
while both the mean and median welfare losses become small even faster. On the other hand,
we ﬁnd that the relaxation of the credit constraint diminishes the incentives for the agents to
learn a good rule and, thus, slows down their learning process. Interestingly, Brown, Chua, and
Camerer (2009) ﬁnd similar eﬀects in their experiments.
Finally, we deal with the problem of changes in the agent’s environment, in particular
her income process. Obviously, in light of the Lucas critique, any adaptive mechanism must
deal with the question of how to adapt to a change in the consumer’s environment. We argue
below that our procedure can be modiﬁed to make the consumer aware of changes in regime.
Furthermore, since for some paramerizations she uses a constant gain adjustment procedure,
even when she is not aware of the change, her ex post reaction to a regime change will be quick
and in the appropriate direction.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the model and the diﬀerent consumption
rules we use; section 3 presents the adaptive algorithm and its properties; section 4 presents
5the measures of welfare we use; section 5 shows the results of the simulations we conducted and
section 6 concludes. All tables and ﬁgures are presented in appendix A.
2 The setting
The consumer’s lifetime utility function is U =
 ∞









1−θ if θ  = 1
lnct if θ = 1
and the discount rate exceeds the rate of interest, so that
0 < δR < 1
where δ is the discount factor, R ≥ 1 is the constant interest factor on one-period bonds. She
starts each period t with wealth wt, of which she consumes the amount ct. She faces a liquidity
constraint
ct ≤ wt (1)
and her wealth evolves according to the ﬂow budget constraint
wt+1 = R(wt − ct) + yt+1,
where yt+1 is next period’s income. We assume that income is an independently and identically
distributed random variable with discrete support {yi}
n
i=1 where y1 < y2 < ... < yn and the
probability of each yi is pi > 0.
The consumer’s behavior is determined by a consumption function
ct = c(wt),
which obeys the liquidity constraint (1). We assume that the consumption function is derived
6from a “notional” consumption function,   c(wt), that ignores the liquidity constraint, so that
c(wt) = min{  c(wt),wt}.
We refer to the notional function   c( ) as the consumer’s “rule”. In what follows, we assume
that   c( ) is increasing and concave, and satisﬁes
Assumption A. There exists   w > 0 such that R(w −   c(w)) + yn < w for all w >   w.
This last assumption guarantees that the consumer’s wealth will be bounded above by
  w in the long run. Speciﬁcally, theorem 1.2 in ¨ Ozak (2009, p.7) assures that under the above
assumptions there is a unique invariant wealth distribution, π, whose support is contained in
the interval [y1,   w].
Additionally, we assume that
  c(0) ≥ 0 and (2)












w if w ≤ w
  c(w) < w if w > w
.
We refer to w as the consumer’s “crossover wealth”. The assumption that w > y1 requires
the liquidity constraint to be binding for at least some observable wealth levels in the long-run,
for otherwise, although the agent might start oﬀ at a wealth level for which she is constrained,
she would immediately after the ﬁrst period get income and wealth levels under which she could
never again be constrained.4 On the other hand, the assumption that w < yn requires the
consumer to save with positive probability in the long run, since otherwise (given Assumption
4This follows directly from the liquidity constraint (1) and the ﬂow budget constraint, which together imply
that wt, t ≥ 1, cannot fall below y1.
7A) she would in ﬁnite time end up with ct = wt = yt for all t. We call a rule   c( ) admissible
if it is increasing, concave and satisﬁes (2), (3) and Assumption A. The adaptive algorithm we
specify below for revising the consumer’s rule ensures that the rule always remains admissible.
In the next two subsections we show conditions under which the fully optimal consumption
rule and a linear rule are admissible.
2.1 Optimal consumption
The optimal consumption function c∗ (w) can be derived from the dynamic programming prob-
lem:
V (w) = max
c≤w
{u(c) + δEyV (R(w − c) + y)}
where Ey is the expectation with respect to income y. This corresponds to the notional function
  c
∗ (w) = argmax
c
{u(c) + δEyV (R(w − c) + y)},
which we refer to as the “fully optimal” rule. For future reference, note that the ﬁrst-order
condition deﬁning   c∗ (w) is
u
′(c) = Eyq,






R(w − c) + y
  
whose value is not known when c is chosen because it depends on next period’s income y.
It is known that under our assumptions the fully optimal rule   c∗( ) is indeed increasing
and concave, that it satisﬁes (2) and Assumption A, and that for δR large enough (i.e. if the
consumer is patient enough or the interest rate is high enough) it also satisﬁes (3) and hence
is admissible (see e.g. Carroll, 2004; Carroll and Kimball, 1996; ¨ Ozak, 2009). From now on
we assume that the consumer is indeed patient enough, so that   c∗( ) satisﬁes (3) and is thus
admissible.
82.2 Linear consumption
We follow Carroll and Allen (2001) in assuming that the consumer’s consumption rule is linear
with coeﬃcients γ = (α,β), so that
  c
γ (w) = α + βw.
In order for   c γ( ) to be increasing and to obey (2) we need α and β both to be non-negative.
In order to satisfy (3) we also need the marginal propensity to consume β to be less than unity.






and the consumption function can be written as
c
γ (w) = min{w
γ + β (w − w
γ),w}
Assumption (3) also requires
(1 − β)y
1 < α < (1 − β)y
n (4)





We say that a coeﬃcient vector γ is admissible if the rule   c γ( ) is admissible. Thus, we see that
Proposition 1. The coeﬃcients (α,β) are admissible if and only if α ≥ 0, β < 1 and they
satisfy (4) and (5).
The set of admissible coeﬃcients is denoted A and is illustrated by the shaded triangular area
in Figure 1 below.
93 Revising the coeﬃcients
The consumer chooses ct according to the consumption function deﬁned by the linear rule   c γt( )
with coeﬃcients γt = (αt,βt), i.e.
ct = min{αt + βtwt,wt}
Then income yt+1 is realized and next period’s wealth becomes
wt+1 = R(wt − ct) + yt+1
Before choosing next period’s consumption the consumer has an opportunity to revise the
coeﬃcients γt. In doing so she ﬁrst computes the “error” she made in period t − 1
et−1 = qt − u
′ (αt−1 + βt−1wt−1)
where qt is the realized marginal continuation value
qt = δRu
′ (ct)
Clearly if et−1 = 0 then if she had known that the marginal continuation value was going to
be qt she would have been happy with her choice of coeﬃcients, because it led her to choose a
notional consumption whose marginal utility was just equal to its marginal cost. In this sense,
even with hindsight she did not make a mistake. On the other hand if et−1  = 0 she made an
ex post error of consuming too much (if et−1 > 0) or too little (if et−1 < 0).
Accordingly, we suppose that her revisions will depend on this error according to the
following multi-step procedure. She begins with a symmetric 2 × 2 “moment” matrix Mt−1,
and then goes through the following steps:
10Algorithm.
1. Choose a new moment matrix Mt using the formula
Mt = (1 − ε)Mt−1 +
 
ξet−1u
′′′ (αt−1 + βt−1wt−1) + u











where ε ∈ [0,1) is a constant gain parameter, ξ ∈ {0,1} is a parameter allowing further
simpliﬁcation of the procedure.5















































3. If Mt is not well conditioned or if the provisional γ
p
t+1 chosen in step 1 is not admissible,






2 subj to qt − u
′ (α + βwt−1) = 0
4. If γ
p
t+1 is still inadmissible, set γ
p
t+1 = γt.
5. Shrink the step size by a factor η ∈ (0,1] and set the new coeﬃcients according to







5If ε = 0 this algorithm can be written as a decreasing gain algorithm. If ξ = 0 then what would have been
a quasi-Newton method, as explained in the next section, becomes what is known in numerical analysis as a
quasi-Gauss-Newton method, which obviates the need for calculating the third derivative u′′′.
6Speciﬁcally, if the condition number r2(Mt) is less than the conventional limit 1010, indicating that the
matrix is reliably nonsingular. See Judd (1998).
113.1 Numerical motivation
The ﬁrst two parts of this procedure (assuming ξ = 1) constitute a simpliﬁed, recursive variant
of the standard Newton method for solving the nonlinear weighted least squares problem of







′(α + βwk−1) − qk)
2
where λ = 1−ε, given the history of marginal continuation values and wealth levels {wk−1,qk}
t
k=1.











































Step 2 above produces the same iteration except that (a) it uses only the term involving the
most recent error et−1 whereas the Newton iteration considers all past errors {ek−1}
t−1
1 , and (b)
it uses the moment matrix Mt rather than the Hessian Ht. Moreover, the formula in step 1 above
for changing Mt is the same as the formula that describes the change in Ht when observation
t − 1 is added. Thus the ﬁrst two steps are equivalent to taking a single Newton iteration but
failing to use information from past errors and then failing to update the parameter values
(αk−1,βk−1) in any but the most recent term of the Hessian.
The fallback procedure in step 3 is a myopic steepest-descent method for solving the
same nonlinear least-squares problem. It works as a provisional “projection facility” in case the
recursive quasi-Newton method, which depends on past history as embodied in the moment
matrix fails; speciﬁcally, in that case she chooses to ignore history and minimize the most recent
error. This is in the spirit of the Levenberg-Marquard method for solving systems of equations,
12which combines the Newton method with the steepest-descent method in each step. Here the
steepest descent method is used only as a fallback option.
In step 4 the consumer gives up if she still cannot ﬁnd an admissible coeﬃcient vector. Step
5 is a commonly used prudential measure to reduce the danger of instability from overreacting
to new information.
3.1.1 Q learning
The procedure is also related to what is known in the Artiﬁcial Intelligence literature as q
learning (Watkins, 1989). In the present context, q learning would have the consumer attempt
to estimate a relationship between wt−1 and qt, perhaps through least squares learning or neural
networks. Each period she would choose ct according to the rule
u
′ (ct) =   Et (qt|wt−1)
where   Et (qt|wt−1) is the estimated value of qt given the current wealth level wt−1 according to
her most recently estimated relationship.
3.2 Informational and computational requirements
The procedure outlined above requires a certain amount of sophistication, in the sense that mo-
ment matrices, Newton methods, condition numbers, Euler equations are not familiar household
names. The consumer must also be sophisticated enough to realize that (a) if her crossover
wealth is less than y1 then her liquidity constraint will never bind, (b) if her marginal propen-
sity to consume is less than (R − 1)/R then her wealth will accumulate with no upper limit
and (c) if her crossover wealth is greater than yn then she will eventually reach a situation
in which her liquidity constraint is binding from then on and will never save. Moreover she
needs to realize that all three of these outcomes are suboptimal for someone with a rate of
time preference greater than the rate of interest but small enough to warrant precautionary
saving, and hence that she should restrict herself to admissible rules. Although this level of
13economic sophistication might seem excessive for a boundedly rational agent, we show below
that dispensing with it, i.e. allowing for rules in a superset of the set of admissible rules, does
not change our results dramatically.
Nevertheless the procedure makes relatively few informational or computational demands
on the consumer, especially in comparison to the demands involved in calculating the optimal
consumption function. This is an important consideration for intelligent behavior in a world
where information storage capacity and computational time are scarce resources. In particular,
all the consumer needs to know is her lifetime utility function, the interest factor R, the gain
parameter ε, the shrinkage factor η and the minimal and maximal possible income levels y1 and
yn. Each period she must remember only 10 numbers: the two most recent coeﬃcient vectors
γt and γt−1, the most recent marginal continuation value qt, the two most recent wealth levels
wt and wt−1, and the three elements deﬁning the most recent moment matrix Mt−1. In addition
to elementary addition and multiplication, she just needs to be able to compute the ﬁrst three
derivatives of her utility function, to determine the conditioning value of a 2×2 matrix and to
compute its inverse.
4 Welfare cost
We use two diﬀerent indices to measure the welfare cost for a consumer of following a speciﬁc
linear consumption rule rather than the fully optimal rule. Both indices are based on ex-ante
equivalent consumption for an agent following a certain rule, starting from a randomly assigned
wealth; but each index uses a diﬀerent probability distribution for assigning initial wealth. The
ﬁrst index uses the stationary distribution implied by the fully optimal consumption rule,
whereas the second one uses the stationary distribution implied by the speciﬁc linear rule. In
either case, the index measures the percentage diﬀerence in certainty equivalent consumption
between the fully optimal rule and the linear rule. As will be seen, the two indices produce
very similar results.
More speciﬁcally, suppose that initial wealth w0 is assigned randomly according to some






V (w)λ(dw) (EV ∗)
where the value function V is deﬁned in section xxx above. Thus we can deﬁne the certainty
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For any given w0, the expected life-time utility of a consumer using the speciﬁc linear rule













where wt evolves according to the ﬂow budget constraint. So, given the distribution λ of w0,
the ex-ante expected lifetime utility and the certainty equivalent consumption for this speciﬁc










γ   (1 − δ)) =
 





If the wealth process generated by c∗(w) satisﬁes Assumption A, then there exists a unique





the values implied respectively by (EV ∗), (CE∗), (EV γ) and (CEγ) when λ = π∗. Thus our










If the linear consumption rule satisﬁes Assumption A, let πγ be the unique invariant distribution




γ be the values when λ = πγ. Thus












In order to study the behavior of the algorithm, we simulate the model for a set of values of
the CRRA parameter θ and the discount factor δ, using the same interest factor R and the
same income process but with diﬀerent initial conditions. We used the income process studied
by Allen and Carroll (2001), which according to these authors “matches (very roughly) the
empirical evidence on the amount of transitory variation in annual household income observed
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics”. The income process is deﬁned by (y1,y2,y3) =
(0.7,1.0,1.3) with probabilities (p1,p2,p3) = (0.2,0.6,0.2) respectively. We also assumed R = 1
as these authors do, allowing us to compare our algorithm with theirs in a transparent way. We
took δ ∈ {0.9,0.95}, θ ∈ {1.5,2,3.0,3.5,4}, which includes the values Allen and Carroll (2001)
assumed in their work (δ = 0.95 and θ = 3), η ∈ {0.5,1}, ξ ∈ {0,1} and ε ∈ {0,0.2}. We
evaluated the linear rules in the [0,2]×[0,2] space with a grid of 40,000 points, each separated
at a distance of 0.01. Finally, we analyzed all rules, both the optimal one and the linear ones,
constraining wealth to be in [0,5] at all times.
5.1.1 Consumption rules and welfare
As a ﬁrst step, we calculated the optimal consumption function c∗(w) for each parameter conﬁg-
uration. Figure 2 shows the rational consumption function c∗ for each parameter conﬁguration.
Under our assumptions, we have that Assumption A is satisﬁed if c∗(w) = 1.3 for some w, which
as the ﬁgure shows, clearly holds for all our parameters, so there exists a unique distribution
π∗ for each parameter conﬁguration, allowing us to calculate EV ∗
∗ and CE∗
∗. As can be seen in
table 1, EV ∗
∗ is decreasing in both δ and θ, while CE∗
∗ is decreasing in θ and increasing in δ.
16In table 3 we present the optimal linear rule for each set of parameters. As can be seen there,







γ. Our calculations show that the behavior of all EV ’s and EC’s is similar
to EV ∗
∗ and EC∗
∗ with respect to the underlying parameters, i.e. all EV ’s decrease in both θ
and δ, while all EC’s decrease in θ and increase in δ.
As can be seen in ﬁgures 3-7, most linear rules in [0,2] × [0,2] generally have a low cost,
according to both our indices. Furthermore, as ﬁgures 8-11 show, the set of consumption rules
that achieve a percentage deviation less than or equal to 0.5% under both the optimal and the
actual distribution of initial wealth is compact and of positive Lebesgue measure. The optimal
linear rule belongs to this set, has a marginal propensity to consume in the range 0.2-0.4 and
its costs are in the range 0.2%-0.3% for our set of parameters (see table 3), which is very
low and generalizes the case studied by Allen and Carroll (2001). Table 3 also shows the loss
incurred when the agent follows the “consume everything” rule γ = (0,1) and the expected loss
of taking a rule at random from the whole set of parameters and from the admissible set.7 As
can be seen there, if the agent ﬁgures out that she should always have a rule in the admissible
set, she can lower her expected loss by almost 40%. On the other hand, if she follows the
“consume everything” rule, which is the simplest of all rules, she can lower her loss even below
her expected loss in the admissible set. This is an interesting result, which we are not aware
has been pointed out in the literature, and which might be an explanation as to why people
save less than optimally. If consumers are boundedly rational and try a random rule in order
to see if it performs better than the consume everything rule, they will be disappointed in
general, which will favor the continued use of the consume everything rule. This feature makes
it a good convention to follow. Still, there are big gains to be attained from ﬁguring out the
optimal consumption rule, which can lower losses three to twentyfold compared to the consume
everything rule.
7Cochrane (1989) realizes similar calculations and ﬁnds even smaller levels of losses. This is due in part to
the fact that he uses aggregate income in order to simulate the income process of the agent. As will be seen
below, the support of the distribution of the income process has a big impact on the welfare losses each linear
rule generates.
175.1.2 Adaptive behavior
In order to understand the behavior of the algorithm we ran 20,000 simulations for each pa-
rameter conﬁguration with random initial wealth and a random initial admissible linear rule.









2 are calculated for the rule
with parameters γt = (αt,βt). The behavior of the distribution is summarized in these ﬁgures
by the maximum and minimum loss (black lines), the mean (blue), the median (green) and the
25-th, 75-th, 90-th, 95-th, 99-th and 99.9-th percentiles (red lines). Notice that the values of all
these measures decrease for the ﬁrst 100-250 periods and then follow a ﬂatter trajectory, which
seems to indicate that within that time frame the algorithm achieves its stationary distribution,
which is more concentrated around the mean.
In those same ﬁgures (12-21) we present the behavior of the consumption rule parameters
and their distribution. The story here is also similar, showing convergence towards a long-run
distribution of the parameters and a higher concentration of the probability of those param-
eters around their mean in roughly 250 periods or less. In order to better appreciate what is
happening, in table 4 we show for periods 0, 50, 100, 250 and 500, the probability of having a
loss less than or equal to 0.5%, i.e. the probability that the consumption rule in that period
belongs to the sets identiﬁed in ﬁgures 8-11. As can be seen in this table, the probability rises
extremely fast, going from almost zero in period 0 for most parameter conﬁgurations, to values
above 30-40% in period 50, increasing above 40-60% in period 100, reaching levels above 80%
by period 250 and above 90% by period 500. Clearly there is much variation in the speed of
convergence to these sets, with the cases (δ,θ) = (0.9,1.5) and (δ,θ) = (0.95,1.5) being the
ones with the highest rates of convergence and the cases (δ,θ) = (0.9,4) and (δ,θ) = (0.95,3.5)
with the slowest convergence rates. This seems to be explained by the eﬀect that both increases
in δ and in θ have on the size of the set of parameters that achieve a loss of less than 0.5%.
However, it is not clear how changes in the underlying parameters aﬀect the speed of conver-
gence, though this relation seems highly non-linear. In part, this seems to be generated by the
fact that changes in θ and δ have similar eﬀects on the curvature of c∗, where increases in δ or
18in θ make the function more concave. So, two functions, one with a high value of δ and a low θ
and the other with a low δ and high θ might be very similar on the domain of interest (see e.g.
the rational consumption functions for (δ,θ) = (0.9,4) and (δ,θ) = (0.95,2), or, (δ,θ) = (0.9,3)
and (δ,θ) = (0.95,1.5)), so that their respective rates of convergence are also similar.
We repeated the simulations assuming diﬀerent values of (ε,η,ξ). Given the overall sim-
ilarity of the results we do not present them here in detail, but limit ourselves to highlight
the major diﬀerences with our previous simulations.8 Under this new set of parameters, the
behavior of the distributions of losses and parameters in terms of convergence to a stationary
distribution within 250 periods was similar as before, though the dispersion around the mean
increased and the speed of convergence decreased especially for ε = 0.2. One striking eﬀect of
this was that the long-run probability of having a consumption rule in the set of consumption
rules with losses less than or equal to 0.5% fell, in some cases dramatically, and stayed sta-
tionary at that level without any tendency to converge towards 1 as was the case before. Still,
this probability was bounded away from zero for all the simulations we realized. In table 5 we
compare the diﬀerent trajectories for the case θ = 3.5 and δ = 0.95, which was the case with
the slowest convergence rate in our baseline simulations.
5.1.3 Social Learning
We additionally looked at the eﬀects of allowing agents to learn through social interaction. To
do so, we set up agents on circles of 25, 50, 100, 200 individuals and allowed each agent to
interact with his left, right or both left and right neighbors. Each agent was allowed to see her
neighbor’s γ
p
t+1. Let i denote the agent and Ni the set of neighbors of agent i, φ ∈ [0,1], then
step 5 of the algorithm works in the following way
(5’) Shrink the step size by a factor η ∈ (0,1]:













8These results can be obtained from the authors by request.
19Allowing for this type of interaction speeds up and increases the probability of convergence
of the algorithm signiﬁcantly as can be seen in table 6. Since neighbor’s initial conditions were
randomly set, this type of social learning can be interpreted as a “keeping up with the Jones’”
scheme, where each agent considers each of her neighbors as the Jones family.
5.1.4 Credit constraints
Additionally, we analyzed how the credit constraint aﬀected learning. So, we relaxed the
credit constraint allowing agents to consume at most wt + B every period, where we took
B ∈ {0.1,0.3}. These simulations showed that the more the constraint was relaxed the slower
agents seemed to learn. This result can be seen as a conﬁrmation of the conjecture proposed by
Satz and Ferejohn (1994), who argue that the more constrained agents are, the more powerful
their incentives to behave rationally. Overall we found that the behavior of this new set of
simulations was similar to the ones described previously, i.e. the less rational agents were
assumed to be, the slower they learned, though they did learn nonetheless.
5.2 Shocks to income
In all the previous simulations we held the income process ﬁxed and changed the diﬀerent
parameters of the model. In this subsection we hold the parameters ﬁxed at θ = 3.5, δ = 0.95,
B = 0, η = 1, ǫ = 0, ξ = 1 and φ = 1, but change the income process. We analyze 4 additional
income processes and compare the behavior of the algorithm and the implied welfare costs under
these new processes with the one implied by the original process. In order to have comparable
results across simulations, we now allow wealth to be in the range [0,10] and consider a grid of
20wealth levels 0.0025 apart. The income processes we consider are:
Y
1 = (0.7,1,1.3) P
1 = (0.2,0.6,0.2)
Y
2 = (1.4,2,2.6) P
2 = (0.2,0.6,0.2)
Y
3 = (1,1.4,2,4.1) P
3 = (0.1,0.2,0.6,0.1)
Y
4 = (0.3,0.7,1,2.1) P
4 = (0.05,0.25,0.6,0.1)
Y
5 = (0.1,0.7,1,1.3,1.9) P
5 = (0.05,0.15,0.6,0.15,0.05)
Figure 22 shows the optimal consumption rules for these cases, while table 13 presents the losses
and optimal rules for these income processes. As can be seen there, the diﬀerences in the income
processes generate quite big and striking diﬀerences in the expected losses an agent faces under
diﬀerent rules. For some income processes, e.g. Y 4 and Y 5, only very few linear rules have low
expected losses, as can be seen in ﬁgures 23-26. This implies that using a random rule is quite
costly. Also, the consume everything rule fares badly, since in these cases the lowest income is
close to zero, generating huge losses for the agent if she ends up being wealth constrained. On
the contrary, the optimal linear rule for each process still has a relatively low associated loss.
Furthermore, the marginal propensity to consume stays in the same range across cases (ca.
0.17-0.25). These results imply that a simple adaptive algorithm, as the one proposed in this
paper, can have big welfare eﬀects for boundedly rational agents, if the algorithm converges
to low welfare losses in general. Table 14 shows the evolution of the probability of having a
rule with a loss lower than 3% when using the algorithm. We increased the range to 3% given
that for some of the income processes no rule has a loss less than 0.5% and almost no rule
has a loss less than 1%. As can be seen in table 14, the qualitative dynamics are very similar
to the ones we had found in our original setup, so that the rate of convergence is similar to
our baseline simulation for most processes. The exception is Y 5 for which convergence requires
close to double the time as in the other scenarios.
Until now, we have assumed that agents do not use any other information of the income
process except its lowest and highest possible levels. One way in which this might slow con-
21vergence to the optimal rule is that the agent cannot distinguish a situation where the Euler
error et−1 is high because of a bad income draw from a situation in which et−1 is high because
of a bad rule. Furthermore, the agent would not notice any changes in the stochastic process
determining income, if these do not aﬀect the range of values that can occur. This is especially
important in the case where ǫ = 0, since this would imply that if she had been learning for
while, it would be diﬃcult for her to change her behavior. On the other hand, if ǫ > 0 the
agent’s behavior never settles down, so that she will incorporate any changes in her environment
into her behavior, even if she does not realize there has been a change.
In order to deal with this issue, we now assume that agents update their parameters in
the same way as before, but change the manner in which they calculate qt. Instead of using
the realized continuation value, an agent uses the average realization of the continuation value
















αt + βt(R(wt−1 − ct−1) + y
i),R(wt−1 − ct−1) + y
i 
, i = 1,...,n.
This change requires the agent to know the whole distribution of the income process, so that
2(n−1) additional numbers have to be remembered by the agent. Table 15 shows the evolution
of the probability of being at a loss lower than 3%. As expected, the time to convergence is
generally lowered, or equivalently, the probability of being close to the optimal rule is increased
for any period for all income processes studied.
This modiﬁcation to our algorithm inoculates it against the Lucas critique. That is,
the agent can now respond immediately to a change in regime by modifying her behavior
accordingly. To see how this works, we analyzed the eﬀects of a shock to income in which the
income process changes to some other one in the set of processes we have studied, and then 25
22years later returns unexpectedly to the original process, assuming that the consumer is informed
immediately of each change in the income process. Given that we have assumed that agents are
sophisticated enough to know that the optimal rule lies in the set AY of admissible rules, which
depends on the income process, we need an assumption specifying the way in which agents
react to the new information of a change in the income process. One possible assumption is
that agents dismiss all their accumulated experience up to that point and start the process from
scratch. This amounts to almost the same exercise we have done in the previous simulations,
except that the initial distribution of wealth will be closer to the stationary distribution of
the original process. Given the fact that initial wealth conditions do not aﬀect the long-run
evolution of the system, we do not need to analyze this scenario again. Instead, we assume
that agents keep their marginal propensity to consume β, while changing α in such a way as to
keep the relative position of the rule in the new set AY ′ similar to the one in AY. In particular,
assuming that the agent’s rule is γt = (αt,βt) at the moment of the shock, she can determine
the value ψ ∈ (0,1) such that βt = αt ∗
 
ψy1 + (1 − ψ)yn
 
, and then use that value in order





′n. Figures 27-30 show the dynamics when agents’
income follows Y 1 in periods 1-25 and 51-100, while it follows Y i, i  = 1 during periods 26-50.
As can be seen there, a permanent shock to income has various eﬀects. First, the distribution
of consumption, wealth, (αt,βt), and losses become more disperse during the shock. Second,
welfare losses overshoot, and only slowly decrease towards the minimum loss. Interestingly, the
eﬀect on welfare is bigger on the average than on the median. This seems to come from the
huge diﬀerence between the low losses implied by good rules and the big losses generated by
bad rules. Thus, even the existence of one individual with a signiﬁcantly bad loss, increases
the average loss towards high values, even though most individuals might be having low losses.
Third, although the eﬀect on consumption comes mostly from the change in the value of the
intercept, which jumps discretely at the moment of the shock, it is the distribution of the
marginal propensity to consume that changes the most during the shock period.
236 Conclusion
The assumption of complete rationality has increasingly been criticized due in part to the high
complexity of many solutions in economic models under this assumption. In response, models
of bounded rationality and learning have recently ﬂourished in economics, though the study
and application of these ideas to approximate solutions of stochastic dynamic programming
problems is still an emerging area. In particular, the study of consumption-saving decisions
under uncertainty and liquidity constraints has been pursued by only a couple of papers with
limited or negative results.
In this paper we have proposed an adaptive algorithm based on Euler equations and have
studied its behavior through time using simulations. We have shown that this algorithm allows
agents to have low welfare losses with high probability in a short time. In our simulations
the probability of being in a neighborhood of the optimal rule is close to 1 within 500 periods
for a set of commonly used parameterizations. Furthermore, we have generalized our adaptive
procedure in order to allow for social learning and changes in the environment. In both cases
the procedure had a similar behavior to our baseline model, with convergence of behavior to
rules with low associated costs (less than 3%) with probabilities over 0.85 within 500 periods
for most parametrizations. Additionally, we analyzed the eﬀect of softer liquidity constraints
on agent’s behavior. As expected, we found that lower constraint levels induce agents to learn
more slowly, since the cost of not behaving optimally falls. These results imply much faster
learning than previous results in the literature, which were derived from learning algorithms
based on estimation of the value function for diﬀerent rules.
An additional feature of the adaptive theory we studied here is its continual out-of-
equilibrium non-optimal dynamics at the individual level, where each agent’s behavior never
settles down and is non-optimal almost all the time. At the same time, aggregate behavior
converges to an equilibrium, in which the average or median agent seems to be behaving (nearly)
optimally. This property is missing in many macroeconomic models, in which both the system
and the individual behave similarly, falling into a fallacy of composition. We have shown that
very simple variations of the model can incorporate ideas of social learning and structural
24change, without generating an increased informational or computational burden for the agent.
Furthermore, the theory is so simple that any sophisticated agent could use pen and paper to
update their consumption rule in a way that will give her a higher level of welfare.
Even though our results seem promising, more research into this model and its extensions
is required in order to see if such an approximation to the rational solution is learnable within
the lifetime of one individual.9 All the simulations were based on parameterizations, which
implied an annual interpretation of time. It would be interesting to analyze the model under
parameterizations that allowed for updating of the rule to occur on a monthly or quarterly
basis. If the time for convergence is still of the same order, one could argue with conﬁdence
that this is a good model of adaptive consumption behavior.
If further exploration of the model proves successful, it would be a step in the direction
of an alternative bottom-up approach to macroeconomics, along the lines advocated by Wein-
traub (1979), Leijonhufvud (1993) and others.10 This bottom-up approach would endow agents
not with decision rules that are always perfectly tailored to their speciﬁc environment, but
rather with simple all-purpose rules that allow the agent to adapt in a plausibly opportunistic
yet imperfect fashion to any given environment. This approach would allow us to ask how an
economic system works to coordinate, for better or worse, the independent decisions of hetero-
geneous interacting agents; a question that the more conventional top-down approach evades
by restricting attention to equilibrium states. We need a bottom-up approach in order to un-
derstand how the “invisible hand” works in actual free market systems, to diagnose what has
gone wrong when coordination failure leads to macroeconomic crisis, and to prescribe system
changes that reduce the likelihood of such failures.
9¨ Ozak (2009) presents analytical results on the behavior of the model for both linear and polynomial con-
sumption rules.
10In particular, Weintraub (1979) argues that “a successful reconciliation of micro and macro might entail a
return to Marshallian price theory, or a well worked out statement of individual behavior in a non-optimizing
framework” (Weintraub, 1979, p.157).
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A Tables and Figures




γ under optimal linear rule, for each conﬁguration of δ and θ





0.9 1.5 -0.1607 0.9841 -0.1650 0.9837
2 -0.1731 0.9830 -0.1786 0.9824
3 -0.2001 0.9806 -0.2027 0.9803
3.5 -0.2128 0.9795 -0.2220 0.9786
4 -0.2257 0.9784 -0.2275 0.9782
0.95 1.5 -0.1962 0.9903 -0.1987 0.9901
2 -0.2184 0.9892 -0.2213 0.9891
3 -0.2555 0.9875 -0.2554 0.9875
3.5 -0.2709 0.9868 -0.2819 0.9862








Figure 1: Admissible set of parameters.
























Figure 2: Optimal Consumption function for diﬀerent parametrizations




γ under optimal linear rule, for each conﬁguration of δ and θ





0.9 1.5 -0.1961 0.9807 -0.2003 0.9803
2 -0.2092 0.9795 -0.2148 0.9790
3 -0.2382 0.9770 -0.2408 0.9768
3.5 -0.2515 0.9759 -0.2607 0.9751
4 -0.2662 0.9747 -0.2680 0.9746
0.95 1.5 -0.2705 0.9866 -0.2730 0.9865
2 -0.2943 0.9855 -0.2972 0.9854
3 -0.3349 0.9837 -0.3347 0.9837
3.5 -0.3525 0.9829 -0.3635 0.9824
4 -0.3319 0.9839 -0.3310 0.9840
















γ ∗ 100, and optimal linear rule. Percentage loss under the
consume everything rule and expected loss over the whole set of parameters and conditional on
rule being in the admissible set.


















0.9 1.5 0.35 0.35 0.61 0.39 0.98 0.93 6.54 3.79 6.34 3.27
2 0.35 0.35 0.62 0.36 1.54 1.38 7.00 4.19 6.61 3.48
3 0.36 0.36 0.61 0.34 3.00 2.50 8.16 5.28 7.38 4.16
3.5 0.37 0.36 0.65 0.30 3.84 3.11 8.80 5.90 7.82 4.55
4 0.38 0.38 0.65 0.29 4.71 3.74 9.49 6.57 8.28 4.98
0.95 1.5 0.37 0.37 0.63 0.33 1.57 1.45 5.78 3.09 5.64 2.77
2 0.37 0.37 0.66 0.29 2.34 2.10 6.41 3.65 6.14 3.20
3 0.38 0.38 0.71 0.23 4.09 3.52 7.84 4.96 7.28 4.21
3.5 0.39 0.39 0.73 0.21 5.03 4.26 8.60 5.68 7.89 4.75
4 0.22 0.22 0.72 0.21 5.79 4.83 6.97 5.57 4.94 4.19




2 below 0.5% at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations
of the algorithm for η = 1, ξ = 1 and ε = 0.






















0.9 1.5 0.2863 0.2950 0.8980 0.8943 0.9650 0.9581 0.9954 0.9927 0.9997 0.9993
2 0.1410 0.1444 0.7706 0.7748 0.9181 0.9149 0.9847 0.9791 0.9963 0.9945
3 0.0127 0.0127 0.4573 0.4390 0.6538 0.6232 0.8781 0.8398 0.9644 0.9424
3.5 0.0104 0.0107 0.4214 0.4204 0.6241 0.6188 0.8678 0.8577 0.9544 0.9490
4 0.0082 0.0084 0.3706 0.3695 0.5725 0.5667 0.8300 0.8184 0.9405 0.9290
0.95 1.5 0.0659 0.0667 0.7436 0.7461 0.9017 0.9021 0.9772 0.9772 0.9877 0.9877
2 0.0155 0.0155 0.5636 0.5614 0.7575 0.7516 0.9212 0.9159 0.9675 0.9649
3 0.0080 0.0086 0.3535 0.3643 0.5453 0.5575 0.7741 0.7827 0.8909 0.8972
3.5 0.0075 0.0079 0.2739 0.2841 0.4241 0.4376 0.6544 0.6706 0.8003 0.8138
4 0.0159 0.0176 0.4773 0.5009 0.6622 0.6913 0.8552 0.8736 0.9248 0.9319




2 below 0.5% at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations
of the algorithm for θ = 3.5 and δ = 0.95.
t = 0 t = 50 t = 100 t = 250 t = 500





















0.5 0 0.2 0.0075 0.0079 0.2730 0.2783 0.2497 0.2520 0.2284 0.2307 0.2223 0.2243
0.5 0 0 0.0075 0.0079 0.2222 0.2329 0.2919 0.3057 0.3999 0.4193 0.4970 0.5167
0.5 1 0.2 0.0075 0.0079 0.2549 0.2627 0.2893 0.2981 0.2922 0.3000 0.2933 0.3011
0.5 1 0 0.0075 0.0079 0.1468 0.1519 0.1954 0.2019 0.2799 0.2888 0.3660 0.3750
1 0 0.2 0.0075 0.0079 0.1355 0.1395 0.1267 0.1303 0.1203 0.1230 0.1216 0.1243
1 0 0 0.0075 0.0079 0.2234 0.2328 0.3355 0.3497 0.5153 0.5344 0.6404 0.6561
1 1 0.2 0.0075 0.0079 0.1273 0.1324 0.1262 0.1309 0.1265 0.1316 0.1279 0.1324
1 1 0 0.0075 0.0079 0.2739 0.2841 0.4241 0.4376 0.6544 0.6706 0.8003 0.8138




2 below 0.5% at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations
of the algorithm under social learning for φ = 1
3, θ = 3.5 and δ = 0.95.
Indiv=200,
Neigh=2
t = 0 t = 50 t = 100 t = 250 t = 500





















0.5 0 0.2 0.0075 0.0079 0.5216 0.5216 0.2787 0.2787 0.1790 0.1790 0.1841 0.1841
0.5 0 0 0.0075 0.0079 0.6502 0.6620 0.8203 0.8243 0.9606 0.9606 0.9939 0.9939
0.5 1 0.2 0.0075 0.0079 0.5980 0.5997 0.6468 0.6475 0.6531 0.6538 0.6380 0.6389
0.5 1 0 0.0075 0.0079 0.0276 0.0278 0.0549 0.0549 0.1800 0.1800 0.2898 0.2898
1 0 0.2 0.0075 0.0079 0.4351 0.4356 0.3520 0.3522 0.3308 0.3308 0.3397 0.3397
1 0 0 0.0075 0.0079 0.8995 0.9020 0.9848 0.9849 0.9992 0.9992 1.0000 1.0000
1 1 0.2 0.0075 0.0079 0.4810 0.4875 0.4794 0.4862 0.4850 0.4910 0.4760 0.4826
1 1 0 0.0075 0.0079 0.7925 0.7960 0.9513 0.9513 0.9991 0.9991 1.0000 1.0000
31Table 7: Expected loss under optimal distribution, ED
γt
1 , and under linear rule’s distribution,
ED
γt
2 , at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations of the consumer’s problem for η = 1,
ξ = 1 and ε = 0.






















0.9 1.5 1.20 1.38 1.09 1.26 0.77 0.85 0.48 0.50 0.42 0.42
2 1.33 1.43 1.35 1.48 0.96 1.04 0.58 0.59 0.47 0.48
3 2.12 2.04 1.97 1.97 1.42 1.44 0.81 0.81 0.60 0.60
3.5 2.65 2.46 2.33 2.26 1.70 1.68 0.94 0.94 0.67 0.66
4 3.24 2.93 2.72 2.58 2.00 1.94 1.10 1.08 0.75 0.74
0.95 1.5 1.26 1.28 1.25 1.30 0.90 0.93 0.58 0.58 0.49 0.49
2 1.72 1.69 1.59 1.60 1.12 1.13 0.69 0.69 0.56 0.55
3 2.91 2.70 2.33 2.25 1.69 1.65 0.95 0.93 0.71 0.70
3.5 3.61 3.29 2.79 2.65 2.01 1.94 1.12 1.08 0.80 0.78
4 4.06 3.57 2.96 2.63 2.13 1.94 1.11 1.04 0.73 0.69
32Table 8: Median loss under optimal distribution, MD
γt
1 , and linear rule’s distribution, MD
γt
2 ,
at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations of the consumer’s problem for η = 1, ξ = 1
and ε = 0.






















0.9 1.5 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.55 0.54 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.38
2 0.98 0.92 0.96 0.91 0.73 0.71 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.43
3 2.02 1.79 1.68 1.54 1.14 1.10 0.65 0.65 0.51 0.52
3.5 2.68 2.32 2.10 1.89 1.38 1.30 0.73 0.74 0.54 0.54
4 3.36 2.86 2.54 2.26 1.65 1.55 0.82 0.81 0.58 0.58
0.95 1.5 1.09 1.04 0.94 0.90 0.69 0.69 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.44
2 1.66 1.55 1.27 1.22 0.89 0.87 0.57 0.57 0.48 0.48
3 3.04 2.74 2.06 1.92 1.33 1.28 0.75 0.73 0.57 0.57
3.5 3.84 3.42 2.52 2.32 1.59 1.50 0.85 0.83 0.63 0.62
4 4.42 3.88 2.79 2.52 1.69 1.57 0.78 0.74 0.52 0.50
33Table 9: Expected loss under optimal distribution, ED
γt
1 , and under linear rule’s distribution,
ED
γt
2 , at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations of the algorithm for θ = 3.5 and
δ = 0.95.
t = 0 t = 5 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50





















0.5 0 0.2 3.61 3.29 2.51 2.30 1.74 1.63 1.05 1.01 0.94 0.93
0.5 0 0 3.61 3.29 2.49 2.30 1.71 1.60 1.12 1.07 0.92 0.89
0.5 1 0.2 3.61 3.29 2.73 2.47 2.02 1.85 1.14 1.09 0.81 0.80
0.5 1 0 3.61 3.29 2.75 2.49 2.13 1.95 1.47 1.38 1.12 1.07
1 0 0.2 3.61 3.29 2.79 2.82 2.67 2.86 2.01 2.07 1.95 2.05
1 0 0 3.61 3.29 2.79 2.81 2.38 2.51 1.51 1.49 1.28 1.26
1 1 0.2 3.61 3.29 2.79 2.65 2.17 2.13 1.40 1.42 1.24 1.25
1 1 0 3.61 3.29 2.79 2.65 2.01 1.94 1.12 1.08 0.80 0.78
Table 10: Median loss under optimal distribution, MD
γt
1 , and under linear rule’s distribution,
MD
γt
2 , at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations of the algorithm for θ = 3.5 and
δ = 0.95.
t = 0 t = 5 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50





















0.5 0 0.2 3.84 3.42 2.46 2.28 1.39 1.33 0.75 0.74 0.67 0.66
0.5 0 0 3.84 3.42 2.46 2.28 1.31 1.26 0.82 0.79 0.69 0.67
0.5 1 0.2 3.84 3.42 2.84 2.59 1.82 1.69 0.85 0.83 0.66 0.65
0.5 1 0 3.84 3.42 2.87 2.62 1.97 1.84 1.21 1.16 0.92 0.89
1 0 0.2 3.84 3.42 2.13 1.98 1.69 1.61 1.10 1.08 1.00 1.00
1 0 0 3.84 3.42 2.13 2.01 1.52 1.45 0.91 0.88 0.70 0.68
1 1 0.2 3.84 3.42 2.52 2.32 1.72 1.62 1.06 1.03 0.98 0.96
1 1 0 3.84 3.42 2.52 2.32 1.59 1.50 0.85 0.83 0.63 0.62
34Table 11: Expected loss under optimal distribution, ED
γt
1 , and under linear rule’s distribution,
ED
γt
2 , at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations of the algorithm under social learning
for φ = 1
3, θ = 3.5 and δ = 0.95.
Indiv=200,
Neigh=2
t = 0 t = 5 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50





















0.5 0 0.2 3.61 3.29 2.30 2.11 1.09 1.03 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.59
0.5 0 0 3.61 3.29 2.31 2.11 1.09 1.03 0.57 0.56 0.49 0.48
0.5 1 0.2 3.61 3.29 2.44 2.22 1.52 1.42 0.69 0.68 0.52 0.52
0.5 1 0 3.61 3.29 2.45 2.23 1.63 1.52 1.00 0.97 0.77 0.75
1 0 0.2 3.61 3.29 1.65 1.53 0.97 0.93 0.64 0.63 0.71 0.71
1 0 0 3.61 3.29 1.66 1.54 0.88 0.85 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.44
1 1 0.2 3.61 3.29 1.69 1.56 0.99 0.95 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.58
1 1 0 3.61 3.29 1.71 1.57 0.92 0.88 0.54 0.53 0.46 0.46
35Table 12: Median loss under optimal distribution, MD
γt
1 , and under linear rule’s distribution,
MD
γt
2 , at diﬀerent periods for diﬀerent parametrizations of the algorithm under social learning
for φ =
1
3, θ = 3.5 and δ = 0.95.
Indiv=200,
Neigh=2
t = 0 t = 5 t = 10 t = 25 t = 50





















0.5 0 0.2 3.84 3.42 2.39 2.21 0.91 0.87 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48
0.5 0 0 3.84 3.42 2.39 2.22 0.92 0.87 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.47
0.5 1 0.2 3.84 3.42 2.54 2.32 1.46 1.37 0.63 0.62 0.47 0.47
0.5 1 0 3.84 3.42 2.55 2.34 1.59 1.49 0.96 0.93 0.75 0.73
1 0 0.2 3.84 3.42 1.52 1.41 0.74 0.71 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.53
1 0 0 3.84 3.42 1.52 1.42 0.66 0.65 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.42
1 1 0.2 3.84 3.42 1.57 1.44 0.81 0.78 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51
1 1 0 3.84 3.42 1.58 1.45 0.75 0.73 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.45
















γ ∗ 100, and optimal linear rule. Percentage loss under the
consume everything rule and expected loss over the whole set of parameters and conditional on
rule being in the admissible set for θ = 3.5, δ = 0.95, B = 0.


















1 0.02 0.02 0.72 0.22 4.62 3.88 6.40 3.27 4.46 2.80
2 0.02 0.02 1.46 0.21 4.62 3.88 7.91 6.94 7.50 5.47
3 0.47 0.36 1.26 0.22 14.64 11.76 14.50 13.97 12.64 12.32
4 0.29 0.28 0.66 0.17 23.79 19.51 21.21 18.98 17.17 15.41
5 0.80 0.76 0.44 0.24 65.99 55.90 53.78 52.53 45.53 44.87




2 below 3% at diﬀerent periods for ﬁxed parametrization of
the algorithm under diﬀerent income processes for θ = 3.5, δ = 0.95, B = 0, η = 1, ǫ = 0, ξ = 1
and φ = 1.






















1 0.3846 0.4980 0.8952 0.8866 0.9064 0.9011 0.9194 0.9141 0.9291 0.9224
2 0.3860 0.4989 0.9054 0.8987 0.9156 0.9124 0.9290 0.9254 0.9373 0.9318
3 0.0252 0.0299 0.3394 0.3441 0.4497 0.4460 0.5427 0.5289 0.5885 0.5701
4 0.0120 0.0129 0.3537 0.3420 0.5006 0.4865 0.6472 0.6335 0.7040 0.6961
5 0.0031 0.0038 0.0462 0.0585 0.0785 0.0958 0.1423 0.1651 0.2142 0.2415




2 below 3% at diﬀerent periods for ﬁxed parametrization of
the algorithm under diﬀerent income processes under ID version of the algorithm for θ = 3.5,
δ = 0.95, B = 0, η = 1, ǫ = 0, ξ = 1 and φ = 1.






















1 0.3846 0.4980 0.9680 0.9742 0.9735 0.9785 0.9804 0.9833 0.9847 0.9862
2 0.3860 0.4989 0.9678 0.9742 0.9728 0.9783 0.9790 0.9821 0.9832 0.9847
3 0.0252 0.0299 0.8103 0.8150 0.8495 0.8468 0.8707 0.8650 0.8840 0.8762
4 0.0120 0.0129 0.6666 0.7393 0.7615 0.8062 0.8317 0.8538 0.8590 0.8707
5 0.0031 0.0038 0.2321 0.2829 0.2652 0.3251 0.3024 0.3659 0.3109 0.3773
37Figure 3: Percentage deviation of equivalent consumption of the linear rule from the optimal
consumption function for diﬀerent values of the intercept and slope, under π∗ (above) and πγ
(below) for θ = 1.5, δ = 0.9 (left) and δ = 0.95 (right).
38Figure 4: Percentage deviation of equivalent consumption of the linear rule from the optimal
consumption function for diﬀerent values of the intercept and slope, under π∗ (above) and πγ
(below) for θ = 2, δ = 0.9 (left) and δ = 0.95 (right).
39Figure 5: Percentage deviation of equivalent consumption of the linear rule from the optimal
consumption function for diﬀerent values of the intercept and slope, under π∗ (above) and πγ
(below) for θ = 3, δ = 0.9 (left) and δ = 0.95 (right).
40Figure 6: Percentage deviation of equivalent consumption of the linear rule from the optimal
consumption function for diﬀerent values of the intercept and slope, under π∗ (above) and πγ
(below) for θ = 3.5, δ = 0.9 (left) and δ = 0.95 (right).
41Figure 7: Percentage deviation of equivalent consumption of the linear rule from the optimal
consumption function for diﬀerent values of the intercept and slope, under π∗ (above) and πγ
(below) for θ = 4, δ = 0.9 (left) and δ = 0.95 (right).
42Figure 8: Set of consumption rules which have a percentage deviation less than or equal to
0.5%, 1%, 3% and more than 3%.
43Figure 9: Set of consumption rules which have a percentage deviation less than or equal to
0.5% 1%, 3% and more than 3%.
44Figure 10: Set of consumption rules which have a percentage deviation less than or equal to
0.5% 1%, 3% and more than 3%.
45Figure 11: Set of consumption rules which have a percentage deviation less than or equal to
0.5% 1%, 3% and more than 3%.




































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 1.5, δ = 0.9.







































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 1.5, δ = 0.95.





































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 2, δ = 0.9.







































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 2, δ = 0.95.








































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 3, δ = 0.9.







































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 3, δ = 0.95.








































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 3.5, δ = 0.9.








































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 3.5, δ = 0.95.







































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 4, δ = 0.9.







































































































































than 0.5%,1%,3% for θ = 4, δ = 0.95.
















Figure 22: Optimal Consumption function for diﬀerent income levels for a ﬁxed parametrization
with θ = 3.5, δ = 0.95, B = 0, η = 1, ǫ = 0, ξ = 1 and φ = 1.
57Figure 23: Percentage deviation of equivalent consumption of the linear rule from the optimal
consumption function for diﬀerent values of the intercept and slope, under π∗ (left) and πγ
(right) for diﬀerent income processes.
58Figure 24: Percentage deviation of equivalent consumption of the linear rule from the optimal
consumption function for diﬀerent values of the intercept and slope, under π∗ (left) and πγ
(right) for diﬀerent income processes.
59Figure 25: Set of consumption rules which have a percentage deviation less than or equal to
0.5% 1%, 3% and more than 3% for diﬀerent income processes.
60Figure 26: Set of consumption rules which have a percentage deviation less than or equal to
0.5% 1%, 3% and more than 3% for diﬀerent income processes.












































































































































































Figure 27: Dynamics under income shocks. During periods 1-25 and 51-100 agents’ income
follows Y 1. During periods 26-50 their income follows Y 2.














































































































































































Figure 28: Dynamics under income shocks. During periods 1-25 and 51-100 agents’ income
follows Y 1. During periods 26-50 their income follows Y 3.










































































































































































Figure 29: Dynamics under income shocks. During periods 1-25 and 51-100 agents’ income
follows Y 1. During periods 26-50 their income follows Y 4.



















































































































































































Figure 30: Dynamics under income shocks. During periods 1-25 and 51-100 agents’ income
follows Y 1. During periods 26-50 their income follows Y 5.
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